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Governments may, and often do, con-sult a broad range of domestic stakehold-ers when formulat-ing or reformulating policy. They rarely consider it necessary, or even advisable, 
to consult other countries about their national legislation and policy. The United 
Kingdom, for example, recently introduced a points system for selecting immigrants. 
The Home Office did not consult potential source countries to see if they agreed with 
the broad policy principle or substantive details of the new system. Similarly, in 
2002, Canada changed the criteria for selection in its own points system to place 
greater emphasis on prior work experience and language ability. 
Canada acknowledges that these changes will probably lead to a shift in the 
major source countries for immigrants (for example, making it more difficult for 
people to immigrate from China and easier for those from India). Neither India nor 
China, nor anyone else, was consulted in making this change. 
The current acrimonious debate in the United States about tighter border con-
trols, guest worker schemes and legalisation for undocumented migrants is also 
largely a domestic debate, even if Latino migrants themselves within the United 
States are making their voices heard on an unprecedented scale.
South Africa’s long night of immigration reform between 1994 and 2004 followed 
a similar pattern. Between 1994 and the 2004 version of the Immigration Act there 
was a Green Paper and White Paper on International Migration, numerous revised 
drafts of immigration legislation to replace the Aliens Control Act and seemingly 
endless consultations, hearings and conferences in Parliament. In other words, 
there was an extensive domestic process of consultation and debate about the shape 
of post-apartheid policy. 
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Despite the growing 
recognition of the 
neeD for cooperation 
anD harmonisation of 
migration policies in a 
globalising worlD, the 
Dominant view persists   
that states have the 
right to set anD imple-
ment their own policies 
without interference or 
consultation with other 
states. immigration 
policy remains the sole 
preserve of sovereign 
states, writes JONATHAN 
CRUSH. inDeeD, national 
immigration policy is, 
almost by Definition, 
about what policies best 
serve the national self-
interest. 
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under- 
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sent remit-
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to alleviate 
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All Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) member states have generally accepted that cross-border migration is an important instrument to achieve regional integration and that the free movement of people is also the inevitable outcome of regional integration. However, there are still significant concerns about the potential negative economic and security implications of free movement.
While the Draft Facilitation Protocol represents a first step in promoting eventual 
free movement, it remains cautious about the extent of this free movement in the 
short to medium term. 
Key to the provisions of the Protocol is the call for the harmonisation of migration 
policies, legislation and practices of SADC member states through amendments of 
national policies and regulations. Thus, the question faced by all member states that 
have or will become party to the Protocol is the extent to which they would need to 
amend their existing policies and legislation. 
The harmonisation of policies and legislation is not just required between mem-
ber states, but critically also between government departments within a particular 
state. For example, there has to be consistency between immigration policies and 
laws on the one hand and labour policies and laws on the other if the SADC Protocol 
is to be implemented successfully. 
In this respect, South Africa has a distinct advantage in that its Immigration 
Act makes provision for the establishment of an Immigration Advisory Board (IAB) 
which is made up of representatives from various government departments, private 
sector organisations and civil society organisations. Under the rubric of “coopera-
tive governance” the function of the IAB is to provide policy advice to the Minister 
of Home Affairs, taking into account the impact that such policy will have on all 
spheres of government. 
The table below, which compares the key policy elements of the Protocol and those 
of South Africa’s Immigration Act, demonstrates that South Africa’s Immigration Act 
is already highly consistent with the Protocol that it has endorsed and would not 
require any substantive amendments. 
However, the concept of free movement in the region and the explicit subordina-
tion of domestic policies and legislation to a regional Protocol suggest that states 
that have signed and ratified the Protocol will have to relinquish a certain amount 
of internal control over migration policy, legislation and administration. It is at this 
level that the prospects for free movement on the basis of a regional Protocol could 
potentially become problematic for member states. 
The principles that underpin immigration policies and laws are related to the 
sovereignty of the nation state, the integrity of national borders and the sole right 
of the state to govern entry into its national territory. This “protectionist” approach 
to migration will likely prevail in domestic policy as long as there remains the per-
ception that migration generally, and free movement in particular, will have more 
how far is sa willing to go on free 
movement of persons in saDc?
Nation	and	region
POLICY ELEMENTS PROTOCOL SA IMMIGRATION ACT
Documentation • 90 days visa-free entry for SADC state citizens; 
• Uniform border passes for citizens residing in border areas; 
• Machine-readable passports.
• 90 days visa-free entry for all foreign nationals; 
• Uniform border passes for citizens residing in border areas; 
• Machine-readable passports.
Security • State must provide for measures to prevent illegal immigration; 
• State must supply necessary security and immigration  
authorities to enforce Protocol.
• Intends to prevent illegal immigration; 
• State will provide necessary security and immigration authorities 
to enforce migration policy.
Residence and Establishment • SADC state citizens must be afforded privileges of residence 
and establishment in accordance with domestic policies of host 
country.
• Provides domestic policies on residence and  
establishment which are applicable to all foreign nationals.
Population Register • Consolidated register of all citizens and permanent residents. • Consolidated register of all citizens, births, and deaths.
Border-Crossing Sites • Separate SADC desk at each major port of entry; 
• Bilateral agreements with mutual border states to  
coordinate operational hours of border-crossing sites.
• No specific stipulation documented.
Expulsion of Individuals • Expulsion of SADC state citizens with a valid residence  
permit may only occur for reasons of public order, public health  
or national security; 
• Written notice of expulsion; 
• Sufficient mechanism for appeal of expulsion notice in a  
domestic court; 
• Consultation of expelled individual with appropriate consular 
authority; 
• Protection from collective or group indiscriminate expulsion; 
• Suspension of expulsion upon notice of appeal.
• Expulsion of any foreign national with a valid residence permit 
may only occur for reasons of public order, public health or national 
security; 
• Written notice of expulsion; 
• Mechanism for appeal in domestic court; 
• Establishes oversight Inspectorate to guarantee that all rights 
afforded to expelled individuals are properly granted.
after nearly ten years of Debate about the Desirability anD practicability of the free movement of persons in the southern africa 
Development community (saDc), a Draft facilitation protocol was aDopteD in august 005. VINCENT WILLIAMS anD LIZZIE CARR write that 
south africa was one of the saDc member states to leaD the way in formally signing the protocol, but caution that in practice the 
country may still be lagging far behinD. 
 to page 3 t
January 007•	Crossings 3
In this edition of Crossings we focus on the con-
tents and implications of South Africa’s Immigration 
Amendment Act of 2004 that came into effect in July 
2005 when the Regulations were finalised. In addi-
tion to providing a brief summary of the Act (see 
pages 5 and 6), we look at and comment on it from 
various angles. 
First, we make the point that there was no active 
engagement with, or solicitation of input from, other 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
member states during the process of drafting South 
Africa’s immigration law. We ask whether this might 
not have been a crucial step in the process, given that 
South Africa’s immigration law will have a signifi-
cant impact on the region as a whole.
We then focus specifically on the similarities and 
differences between South Africa’s immigration law 
and the Draft SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of 
Movement of Persons. In this regard, we conclude 
that while the similarities between the provisions of 
the two documents outweigh the differences, it is not 
so much in terms of consistency that there is a prob-
lem, but rather in terms of orientation. 
The general thrust of the argument is that the 
proper harmonisation of immigration policies, laws 
and practices at a regional level will require the vol-
untary surrender of a degree of sovereignty on the 
part of individual states, but that this is not likely to 
happen in the short term.
We speak to the Chief Director of the Immigration 
Inspectorate and ask him about his views on the pur-
pose and objectives of the Immigration Amendment 
Act and whether he thinks that the current immigra-
tion legislation is appropriate in both a national and 
regional context.
Two articles focus on the implementation of the 
Act. The first argues that despite its noble intentions 
in facilitating the movement of persons, this is likely 
to be undermined by a preoccupation with enforce-
ment. The second looks at the implementation of the 
Act since coming into effect and demonstrates the 
actual shortcomings in terms of service delivery.
We also report on a recent project in which we 
interviewed female migrants in South Africa, asking 
them about their experience of migration. We use this 
as a basis to look at whether, and the extent to which, 
the new Immigration Act may facilitate or complicate 
the migration of women.
Finally, we provide a chronological overview of 
the process of South Africa’s immigration legislation 
drafting, which in and of itself is quite revealing in 
terms of helping us to understand the complexities of 
the process.
South Africa’s approach to immigration, as leg-
islated and implemented through the Immigration 
Amendment Act of 2004 and its accompanying 
Regulations, will have a profound impact on the coun-
try’s ability to attract skilled people from other parts 
of the world and promote foreign direct investment 
and tourism – all key factors in ensuring sustainable 
economic growth, not only at a national level, but also 
at a regional level. It is too early to assess whether, in 
fact, the new immigration laws provide an appropri-
ate and adequate basis upon which to achieve these 
objectives. Only time will tell.
Editorial
At no point, however, did the drafters and driv-
ers of the new policy systematically consult other 
countries in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). It was not considered neces-
sary to consult beyond South Africa's borders by 
the Green Paper and White Paper Task Teams, 
the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs or the 
Department and Ministry of Home Affairs. 
At one level, this is completely unremarkable. 
South Africa’s Immigration Act was a piece of 
legislation by and for South Africans. Why should 
countries from the SADC have had any say in 
its formulation? The problem, though, is that in 
assuming that SADC countries should have no 
voice in the making of the new policy, their input 
and their interests were assumed or ignored.
Other SADC countries do have a keen inter-
est in the shape of South African immigration 
policy. Those policies have always affected them 
deeply. Over the years, hundreds of thousands 
of migrants from South Africa’s neighbours have 
made the country their temporary home, built 
the South African economy, underdeveloped their 
own and sent remittances home to alleviate pov-
erty and hardship. 
Although they have had little say in making 
South Africa’s new policy, the impact on them is 
likely to be considerable. It is therefore impera-
tive to understand exactly what the implications 
are of South African immigration policy on its 
neighbours. Will it make cross-border movement 
easier or more difficult? Will it mean fewer or 
more job and other economic opportunities in 
South Africa? Will it reduce or facilitate informal 
cross-border trade and the flow of remittances? 
Will it lead to a brain drain to South Africa from 
skills-starved neighbours? Will it decrease or 
exacerbate the xenophobia that makes the lives 
of many migrants a misery? Will its enforce-
ment provisions protect or violate the basic 
rights of citizens of neighbouring countries? Will 
it, in seeking to serve South Africa’s national 
self-interest, have negative implications for the 
national self-interest of its neighbours? These 
are critical questions requiring much additional 
discussion. This issue of Crossings is intended to 
kick-start the debate. 
Dr Jonathan Crush is the Director of the Southern 
African Migration Project at Queen’s University in 
Canada.
Nation	and	region
negative than positive outcomes. 
In this regard, the implementation of the Protocol will require much more than alterations to 
immigration legislation or the introduction of mechanisms (such as SADC desks at ports of entry) 
to facilitate entry. In the longer term, it will also require a fundamentally different philosophical 
approach to migration in the region; an approach that emphasises and seeks to enhance the positive 
impact that migration could have. 
As one of the more affluent SADC member states, South Africa has been a long-standing opponent 
of the free movement of people in the region. This has been in part because many South African citi-
zens believe that if migration policy and law make it possible and easier for people to cross borders it 
will result in a one-way flow of migrants from the less to the more developed countries in the region, 
including South Africa. 
The ongoing perception and belief among citizens and within government that migrants will drain 
precious social welfare resources, compete unfairly for jobs and generally place a burden on the South 
African economy has been a key factor in determining South Africa’s position on free movement in 
the region. 
In signing and supporting the Facilitation Protocol, South Africa has implicitly committed itself 
to countering these negative perceptions of migrants and migration, and to promoting the potential 
positive contribution that migration can have on South African society. 
This is clearly consistent with the more liberal approach to migration in the region, which is what 
the Draft Protocol sets out to achieve. However, whether this is indicative of a substantially different 
philosophical approach – namely the willingness to relinquish control over certain aspects of migra-
tion in what appears to be a contradiction of the principles of state sovereignty and the integrity of 
national boundaries – remains to be seen. 
Vincent Williams is a Project Manager with SAMP and Lizzie Carr was an IDASA/SAMP intern from the 
University of North-Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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NM: What in your view are the key objectives of the 
Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004 and what are 
the factors that influenced or had an impact on the 
contents of the Act?
GN: There are two primary objectives. First, to 
achieve alignment between the Act itself and the 
Immigration Regulations. We have tried to ensure 
that the Minister’s powers are established in the 
Act, as opposed to the previous Act where powers 
in the Regulations exceeded the powers that were 
in the Act. Secondly, the issue of facilitating move-
ment. The President, in his 2004 State of the Nation 
Address, made it clear that our immigration regime 
has to facilitate trade and facilitate movement of 
persons into South Africa, so the amendments were 
also made to ensure that our Immigration Act, as far 
as possible, is facilitative in nature and allows for 
better movement of persons for various reasons into 
and out of South Africa. 
NM: To what extent, do you think, will the contents and 
provisions of the Act contribute to the achievement 
of the objectives, particularly those objectives related 
to facilitating economic growth, attracting skilled for-
eigners, countering xenophobia, promoting a human 
rights-based culture of enforcement and preventing 
and reducing illegal immigration?
GN: I think this is the question that is being asked 
firstly by government itself in the context of ASGISA 
[the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for 
South Africa] and JIPSA [the Joint Initiative on 
Priority Skills Acquisition]. The position of the 
Department has always been that the Act is ade-
quately facilitative in nature. If you look at the 
array of permits that are in the Act, it covers almost 
all the reasons that should make it possible for one 
to invest in and travel to South Africa for economic 
reasons, including the issue of skills. We must con-
cede that the issue, the biggest challenge that we 
have identified, even in our report to Cabinet, has 
been the mechanisms and ability of the Department 
to deliver those services. The policy is very clear, it 
is very facilitative. It is the implementation of that 
Act and the Regulations that is currently a matter 
of concern. But I must state that even in the whole 
array of permits and so on that we have to deal with, 
we have managed to isolate, in interaction with vari-
ous stakeholders, the areas of concern. The first has 
been the intra-company transfer work period where 
business has said that those periods, the period of 
validity of two years, needs to be reviewed and we 
would need to consult with our stakeholders because 
that is not a Home Affairs determination, it will need 
to be done with the DTI [Department of Trade and 
Industry] and other stakeholders. And the only other 
permit is the general work permit, where it is felt 
that the process is cumbersome. Even that unfortu-
nately is not only up to Home Affairs. There are 
other stakeholders, like SAQA [the South 
African Qualifications Authority], that have 
to validate and verify foreigners’ qualifica-
tions and so on. So I still insist the policy is 
responsive. Implementation is not what it 
should be but we are working on it. 
NM: The Act makes reference to the need to 
make sure that “...security considerations are 
fully satisfied...” Can you elaborate on what 
this means?
GN: Immigration has a dual purpose. One is 
that of enabling and facilitating movement 
of people across borders and the second 
is really to ensure the integrity of those 
borders. So the provisions really are about 
saying that in the process of enabling move-
ment there should be consideration of all 
related issues. When a person crosses bor-
ders into South Africa or out of South Africa, 
that person is a human being, a person with 
social and political and different dynamics. 
So when Gcinumzi comes into South Africa, 
even if he wants to invest, we need to make 
sure that Gcinumzi, for example, is not 
investing money that is stolen from another 
country. So our processes need to ensure 
that there is sufficient liaison between all 
the stakeholders, especially security stakeholders, 
so that in the process of facilitating movement of 
persons you do not place the lives of citizens of South 
Africa under threat; [that] due to an over eagerness 
to facilitate this movement [you are still] ensuring 
the protection of those citizens. 
NM: The Act also makes reference to the role of South 
Africa in the continent and the region. In your view, 
does the Act sufficiently take into account and respond 
to the realities of migration in the region and the con-
tinent? 
GN: When you deal with migration you are dealing with 
a social phenomenon so it is impossible [to] say the 
Act sufficiently covers the human condition, but we 
always take our cue from our foreign policy. We have 
said, and government has said, that South Africa’s 
security depends on the security of the region and 
the security of the continent. We fully embrace the 
concept of migration and development as a key policy 
that we pursue, so it’s a dual approach really to say 
that we can’t just have immigration policies that are 
responsive. Your economic policy, for example, needs 
to reflect your commitment to the continent and to 
the region. So I would say comparatively speaking it 
has been said by even our counterparts in SADC [the 
Southern African Development Community] that 
our Act is generally very responsive. There are of 
course realities. You cannot please everyone all the 
time. So I do think that it is work in progress; your 
immigration policy can never be rigid and cast in 
stone otherwise you get the British experience which 
you do not want to see in Africa. 
NM: What do you think are the major strengths of the 
Act?
GN: Remember that this Act is hardly a year old. So in 
terms of reviewing its impact, it will only be oppor-
tune in about a year to start saying what has been 
the impact of the Act. But to date I would say the 
biggest strength is that the changes that are there, 
contrary to popular belief, have not been so substan-
tive that they have rendered the whole immigration 
regime unusable. There have been minor changes in 
the Immigration Act, it has therefore ensured that 
there is stability in terms of the implementation, 
in terms of the processes. Secondly the wide variety 
of permits and so on is very useful. The fact that 
the Act is responsive to the needs of South Africa 
is a strength because we’re reviewing our policies 
on an annual basis, issues like the quota permits. 
Accommodation is made there for the Minister to 
publish quota permits at least annually so there 
can be reviews, so I think it’s a very open-ended 
facilitative Act which does not look at immigration 
as a purely policing function but looks at it also as a 
facilitative function. 
NM: What do you think are the Act's major weaknesses?
GN: I think the weakness primarily is that it has not 
been widely communicated; one of the things that 
gninumzi ntlakana, chief Director of the inspectorate Directorate 
in the national immigration branch.  Ntombi Msibi
in his own words
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GNINUMZI NTLAkANA is the chief Director of the inspectorate Directorate in the 
national immigration branch that was establisheD following the passage of the 
immigration amenDment act of 00. NTOMBI MSIBI asKeD him his views about the  
purpose anD obJectives of the act.
 to page 5  t
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The Preamble to the Immigration Act sets out the overall aims and objectives of South Africa’s revised immigration law and provides important insight into the orientation, purpose and function of the newly- 
established immigration regime. In broad terms, 
the Act is designed to provide for the regulation 
of the admission of foreigners to, their residence 
in, and their departure from South Africa. In 
specific terms, the Act sets out various objectives, 
as follows:
• To ensure that the requirements and criteria 
for obtaining immigration permits are objec-
tive, predictable and reasonable, and to sim-
plify procedures to ensure that permits are 
issued as speedily as possible;
• To enable the state to retain control over for-
eigners to satisfy security requirements;
• To promote economic growth through the 
employment of needed foreign labour, the 
facilitating of foreign investment, the promot-
ing of tourism and increasing the development 
of South Africa’s human resources capacity;
• To make sure that xenophobia is prevented 
and countered;
• To promote a human rights-based culture of 
enforcement;
• To ensure that South Africa complies with its 
international obligations; and
• To educate civil society on the rights of foreign-
ers and refugees.
In terms of access to South Africa’s labour 
market, which is one of the key imperatives 
underpinning the redrafting of the immigration 
legislation, the Act provides for several ways to 
legally migrate to South Africa for the purposes 
of employment: 
General work permit
This is for individuals who have an offer of 
employment in their possession and need to 
obtain authorisation to enter and work in South 
Africa. The Department of Labour must provide 
certification that no suitable South African citi-
zen or permanent resident could be recruited for 
this job before issuing such a permit. 
Corporate work permit
In terms of this provision, private sector corpo-
rations can apply to employ a predetermined 
number of foreign workers without having to 
apply for a separate general work permit for 
each. Both the Department of Labour and the 
Department of Trade and Industry must provide 
certification that the corporation is reliant on or 
in need of foreign workers. 
Quota work permit
The regulations that accompany the Act deter-
mine that there are certain economic sectors 
that experience shortages of skilled personnel 
and establish that a certain number of foreigners 
may be employed by corporations in those sec-
tors until the quota has been filled. The quotas 
are determined through consultations with the 
Department of Trade and Industry.
Intra-company transfer permits
This is a once-off, non-renewable permit, valid for 
two years, issued to employees of multi-national 
companies that allows them to work in South 
Africa without having to apply for a general or 
quota work permit
Exceptional skills or  
qualifications permit
This is a work permit issued to a person who is 
deemed to be exceptionally skilled or qualified. It 
was designed to fast-track applications for work 
permits for especially skilled individuals.
In addition to the above employment-related 
temporary residence permits, provision is also 
made for business permits, study permits and 
immigration act 19 
of 00: a summary 
and review
after nearly ten years in the maKing, south africa’s new immigration law was 
eventually finaliseD with the proclamation of the immigration amenDment act 
no 19 of 00. this act proviDes for significant amenDments to the immigration 
act no 13 of 00 anD came into effect in July 005, when its implementing  
regulations were finaliseD. VINCENT WILLIAMS summarises the Key provisions of 
south africa’s new immigration legislation.
you find is that the Act is not commonly known. When people 
argue about the Act they argue from a position of ignorance 
which is probably not a problem with the Act itself but with how 
we are managing the Act. I can’t think of any material difficul-
ties with the Act other than those that I have mentioned where 
business has raised problems with certain permits which are 
really operational and that can be resolved. 
NM: Are there any shortcomings in the Act? What might these be?
GN: Other than the issues I have raised I wouldn’t have any par-
ticular issues. But I think stakeholder liaison is important, we 
would depend on the stakeholders to highlight some of the areas 
that they deem to be problematic in terms of the implementation 
of the Act so that we, as a responsive government, would then be 
able to see what possible solutions can be implemented.
NM: In terms of implementation – it is envisaged that not only the 
DHA [Department of Home Affairs], but several other government 
departments will be involved, either directly or indirectly. Do you 
think capacity for implementation exists within the DHA and other 
government departments?
GN: One of the Act's objectives is to create an enabling environ-
ment for other departments or stakeholders to play their role 
in assisting with the enforcement of the Act, so I think insofar 
as there needs to be interdepartmental liaison, the Act is suf-
ficiently empowering the Department [of Home Affairs]. Also 
in terms of the systems that government has put in place, the 
Department [is empowered], especially through the cluster proc-
esses of government. I think we need to remember that Home 
Affairs doesn’t work in isolation. So as part of the clusters, for 
example, your security cluster or your international relations 
peace and security cluster, there is sufficient room for coordina-
tion, for consultation with government departments. It is a proc-
ess that is basically a year old in terms of the mechanisms we 
are trying to put in place, but there is room for improvement. 
NM: What do you think are the most important needs/requirements in 
terms of implementation of the Act and its accompanying regula-
tions?
GN: I think the biggest challenge that faces the Department, which 
is probably related to the previous question, is that of capac-
ity. And capacity is not just about the numbers. For example, 
there is currently a drive in Home Affairs to professionalise the 
Department, so it’s about the skills and abilities of the people 
that you recruit to assist at your front desk. It is also issues 
of changing business models, to start saying how do we make 
sure that citizens are able to get documents, to get the assist-
ance that they need within the required turnaround times. And 
I think that’s where the challenge lies. The biggest challenge is 
to capacitate Home Affairs in terms of people, numbers, skills, 
human resources, the technology that we are using and also in 
terms of the infrastructure, I think it has been pointed out many 
times that your typical Home Affairs [office] is not necessarily a 
friendly place to be in, so I think it is those challenges of delivery 
that probably pose more of a challenge than the Act itself. 
NM: If you could rewrite South Africa’s immigration laws, what are the 
most significant changes that you would make to the existing Act?
GN: Fortunately I do not have to rewrite South Africa’s immigra-
tion laws, and I wouldn’t think that there are significant chang-
es that would have to be made to the Act itself. As I said before, 
it is really about saying “how do we improve our obligation to 
deliver services” and I think as a manager more than a legislator 
I would be more concerned with that question. In terms of the 
Act now, what are the responsibilities I as a manager have in 
ensuring that the Act is implemented and is applied constantly 
throughout the Republic?
Ntombi Msibi is a Researcher at the Southern African Migration 
Project in Johannesburg.
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visitors’ (tourist) permits. An interesting addition to the visitors’ permit is that these 
may now also be issued for up to three years for the purpose of research, sabbaticals 
and voluntary or charitable activities provided that the purpose of the visit does not 
coincide with remunerated employment.
In terms of permanent residence permits, permission can be obtained by people 
who have had a valid work permit for five years or longer and/or who have received 
an offer of permanent employment. Similarly, the spouse of a citizen or resident will 
be granted permanent residence after five years provided that a “good faith spousal 
relationship” continues to exist. A third category of “direct residence” covers people 
investing in or establishing a business in South Africa, on condition that they pro-
vide the necessary financial guarantees and undertakings. Permanent residence can 
also be granted to people planning to retire in South Africa or who have relatives in 
South Africa, on condition that they provide the necessary financial guarantees.
Like the previous version of the Act, the amended version makes provision for the 
establishment of an Immigration Advisory Board 
(IAB). The Act specifies that it must consist 
of the Director-General of the Department 
of Home Affairs as well as the head of the 
National Immigration Branch, representa-
tives of a wide range of government depart-
ments including Foreign Affairs, Trade and 
Industry, Defence, Safety and Security, 
Education and Labour, a representative 
of organised business, a representative of 
organised labour and up to five individuals 
appointed by the Minister “on the basis of 
their knowledge, experience and involve-
ment pertaining to immigration law, control, 
adjudication and enforcement”.
In terms of its function, the Act stipulates 
that the Board will have an advisory role 
concerning immigration policy and regula-
tions or any other matter related to the Act 
for which the Minister may request advice. 
Importantly, the Board also has the function 
of serving as the interdepartmental forum on 
all matters concerning immigration. In other 
words, it is envisaged that the IAB will be responsible for ensuring coordination and 
cohesion when it is required in the formulation and implementation of immigration 
policy, regulations and procedures.
Section 8 of the Act sets out the Review and Appeal procedures. It provides for two 
types of appeals. The first applies to people who have been refused entry to South 
Africa or, if already in the country, are found by an immigration officer to be “illegal 
foreigners”. As part of the process of refusing entry or declaring a person an “illegal 
foreigner,” an immigration officer is obliged, in terms of the Act, to inform the person 
that he or she may request the Minister of Home Affairs to review the decision. If 
a person has been refused entry and has appealed to the Minister, the Act specifies 
that the person must leave the country and await the Minister’s decision outside 
the Republic. A person already in the country who has been found to be an “illegal 
foreigner” cannot be deported pending the Minister’s decision.
The second appeal procedure relates to people, other than those referred to above, 
whose rights have been “materially and adversely affected” by a decision taken in 
terms of the Act. Such a person must be informed in writing of the decision and must 
be given reasons for the decision. An appeal may then be lodged with the Director-
General of Home Affairs who may uphold, reverse or modify the original decision. 
If the person does not accept the Director-General’s decision, he or she may appeal 
to the Minister, who will then uphold, reverse or modify the decision taken by the 
Director-General.
The significance of the review and appeals procedure is that it restricts the 
options of appeal to the Ministry and Department of Home Affairs. In other words, 
the Immigration Act does not provide for a person to appeal a decision or action of 
the Department or Ministry of Home Affairs through an independent body or the 
courts. This does not, however, preclude that person from using other legislation, 
such as the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, to challenge the decisions and 
actions of the Department or Ministry of Home Affairs.
As the primary mechanism for enforcing immigration law, the Act establishes 
an Inspectorate to investigate any suspected contravention of the Immigration Act. 
The Inspectorate has wide-ranging powers of investigation, search, seizure, arrest 
and detention, including the power to compel people to appear before the Director-
General and answer questions, give evidence or produce relevant documentation. 
Several other provisions on enforcing immigration law are also contained in the 
Act. These include:
• The right of an immigration official or police officer to ask a person to identify him 
or herself as a citizen, resident or legal foreigner and, if the officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person is not entitled to be in the country, he or she 
can take the person into custody to interview him or her and/or verify his or her 
identity or status. If necessary, the officer can detain that person until his or her 
status is determined;
• The obligation on organs of state and other prescribed institutions to try to verify 
the identity or legal status of a person receiving services. If they are unable to do 
so, they can report such a person to the Director-General of Home Affairs, pro-
vided that services shall not be withheld;
• The requirement that the owner or manager of premises that provide lodgings 
and/or sleeping accommodation for payment should keep a register of everyone 
using their services and produce that register 
when requested by an immigration or police 
officer; and,
• Making it an offence to fail to comply with 
any of the provisions of the Act or knowingly 
and wilfully to contravene any part of the Act 
or help anyone else to contravene any part of 
the Act.
• Anyone convicted of contravening the Act 
could be liable to a fine or imprisonment or 
both, the severity of which would depend 
on the nature, extent and frequency of the 
contravention(s). 
The Act in its current form is certainly 
a significant improvement on the previous 
Aliens Control Act and the original version of 
the Act that was passed in 2002. Specifically, 
the objectives of the Act to facilitate legal 
entry and develop reasonable, objective and 
predictable criteria for entry should be wel-
comed, as should the objectives of promoting 
rights-based enforcement strategies, using 
immigration policy and law to promote econom-
ic growth, countering xenophobia and engaging in public education programmes on 
the rights of foreigners. It is a more balanced set of objectives and desired outcomes, 
substantially different in both tone and intent from the original Act, which appeared 
to have as its primary emphasis the need to prevent illegal immigration to South 
Africa. 
However, despite this, there is still an emphasis on enforcement in the current 
Act, with much detail on mechanisms and strategies for enforcement. Other than 
removing some of the more onerous requirements that were in the previous Act – 
such as the need for work permit applicants to submit certification from a chartered 
accountant – the current Act still does not go far enough in detailing how it intends 
to facilitate legal immigration, promote economic growth, counter xenophobia and 
develop a rights-based culture of enforcement. 
While it is true that the finer details of implementation should be contained in the 
regulations, the fact that the Act does not elaborate on the more positive objectives 
described above is a substantial shortcoming. Arguably, just as the Act establishes 
an Inspectorate and defines its powers and authority for the purpose of enforcement, 
it could also institutionalise some of the other objectives. This may have been partly 
what was envisaged in the establishment of the IAB, but the IAB acts only in an 
advisory capacity to the Minister and, in terms of its composition, it is probably too 
unwieldy and represents too many diverse interests to deliver any effective results.
Perhaps, as the current Minister has pointed out on more than one occasion, the 
biggest problem with the Act is that its provisions are not informed by any substan-
tively agreed on set of policy outcomes, given that the process of developing policy (in 
the form of a White Paper) was not completed before the process to draft legislation 
was put in place. As a consequence, amendments to immigration legislation since 
2002 have been ad hoc and by default rather than by design. 
The question remains – what are the objectives of South Africa’s immigration 
regime? If the answers can be agreed on and written up as policy statements with 
desired outcomes, perhaps the immigration legislation itself, and particularly the 
implementation of it, would be less fragmented and it would be possible to establish 
regulations that promote the achievement of the policy objectives.
Vincent Williams is a Project Manager with SAMP
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Within the new immigration legislation, the preoccupation with enforcement is demonstrated explicitly in terms of certain provisions of the Act, but also implicitly with the use of particular language that appears to set the tone for the legislation as a whole. Whether consciously intended or not, the Act manages to erect subtle linguistic barriers between citizens and non-citizens – for example, section 2 situates 
foreigners within the context of their status as “non-citizens” rather than in relation 
to their categories of residence. 
Clause xvii states, “foreigner means an individual who is not a citizen,” and point-
edly does not include the previous Act’s caveat “nor a resident.” This has the effect 
of grouping legal permanent residents together with temporary residents as well 
as undocumented persons, though the Act does define illegal foreigners separately. 
While appearing to be minor, these changes carry more weight than a simple adjust-
ment of diction; they appear to contribute to defining immigration policy on the basis 
of exclusion and protectionism. 
The terminology of the Act is made all the more troubling by new provisions 
which allow for greater discretion by the Department of Home Affairs in enforc-
ing the legislation. The Act contains a number of clauses that extend the control of 
the Director-General in determining immigration affairs. Section 35 allows for the 
arrest and detention of a suspected “illegal foreigner” without a warrant and at a 
location that is entirely at the discretion of the Director-General. 
On a concrete level, the section permits the Department of Home Affairs to stop 
and hold any individual on what it alone deems to be “reasonable grounds,” with lit-
tle judicial or public oversight to ensure fair practice. In this way, the Immigration 
Amendment Act amounts to what Jonathan Klaaren calls “control creep”. 
The legislation takes a bold step towards establishing nearly unchecked author-
ity over the lives of immigrants, migrants and refugees. When it comes to enforcing 
immigrant law against undocumented persons, the Department of Home Affairs 
stands alone, without the benefit of the judiciary or civil society to provide checks 
and balances.
This notion that immigration must be firmly managed to prevent contravention 
of the law is reinforced in the Act’s discussion of non-citizens and documentation. 
Section 30 establishes as grounds of prohibited personage anyone found in posses-
sion of a fraudulent residence permit, passport or identification document. While 
acknowledging what appear to be fairly widespread levels of fraud and corruption 
in relation to legal documentation, given the large portion of the population who 
might have trouble accessing proper identification (particularly in rural areas) this 
is extremely problematic, for it removes flexibility in determining which people are 
knowingly and deliberately in contravention of the law. 
For instance, a child who enters the country with fraudulent documents given 
by his or her parents would automatically be considered prohibited. Rather than 
approaching cases individually with an eye towards human rights concerns and the 
economic needs of the country, improperly documented people are seen as inevitably 
“criminal”. 
This approach is echoed later in the section, which prohibits people who have 
been convicted of any drug-related charges, widening the net from the previous 
Act’s restriction on drug traffickers only. In this manner, the Act reveals a conscious 
decision to increase the number of foreign-born individuals who might be deemed 
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“criminal”. As a result, the state has the appearance of being justified in stepping 
up its efforts at enforcement - if more people are eligible to violate the law then it 
appears natural to crack down on the “hordes” of “illegals”.
Towards the end of the Act a strange contradiction comes into play. Earlier sec-
tions emphasise either the need for increased enforcement or describe the provisions 
that will allow the Department of Home Affairs to implement this process. Sections 
36, 39, 42 and 43, however, place the responsibility for enforcement elsewhere; 
with individuals and institutions. While the Act provides for greater Department 
of Home Affairs discretion to guard against “illegal foreigners” and “criminals,” it 
also arranges for the burden of administrative duty to fall largely outside of the 
Department of Home Affairs itself. 
First, the Act enhances the responsibility of individual citizens in executing immi-
gration enforcement. Section 36, for example, makes the master of a ship liable for 
ascertaining the immigration status of the ship’s passengers. Any irregularity is to 
be reported to an immigration officer or other authorised people without delay - and 
to do otherwise could result in a fine or jail time for the ship master. The same holds 
true for the owners of accommodation, as delineated in section 39. The “person in 
charge of any premises” of accommodation must keep a register of everyone provided 
with lodging or sleeping accommodation. Failure to do so could result in prosecution 
in terms of the Immigration Act.  
The trend persists in those sections of the Act dealing with public institutions 
and other government departments. Section 42 states, “When possible, any organ of 
state shall endeavour to ascertain the status or citizenship of the persons receiving 
its services and shall report to the Director-General any illegal foreigner….” Section 
43 creates the same requirement with respect to “prescribed institutions or persons 
other than organs of state”. 
In plainer language, this means that institu-
tions ranging from public hospitals to schools 
to the Department of Transport now have a 
legal obligation to screen recipients or benefi-
ciaries to determine potential illegality in the 
course of delivering services. The state has 
forcibly enlisted “help” to enforce its immi-
gration policy. 
In essence, the Immigration Amendment 
Act amplifies the powers of the Department 
of Home Affairs to strictly enforce immigra-
tion law, and it encourages this enforce-
ment through its wording and tone. From a 
practical perspective, however, the Act does 
not make any substantive changes to the 
administrative capability of the Department 
of Home Affairs to actually enact its focus on 
enforcement. What could be the purpose of 
simultaneously extending the duties of non-
Department entities and the powers of the 
Department of Home Affairs? Here lies the 
great trick of the Act: it gives the Director-
General of the Department of Home Affairs 
virtually complete authority over the imple-
mentation of enforcement, but leaves much of 
the actual day-to-day enforcement to individual 
citizens and non-governmental entities. In this way, the Act allows more enforce-
ment “bang for its buck” in that it gives the state licence to do more without over-
stepping its material constraints.
If this is the case, what is so bad about the Act? There can be no dispute that suf-
ficient enforcement of immigration policy and law is both necessary and important, 
and enabling the implementation of laws with fewer resources is always a positive 
development. However, the real problem with the Act is the way in which it will 
negatively impact on certain groups of non-citizens as well as South African society 
and the economy as a whole. 
Foremost among the negative effects of the Immigration Amendment Act is its 
“targeting” of non-citizens as objects of distrust. The fact that all “foreigners” are 
lumped together without distinction and assumed to have criminal intent sets the 
stage for two dangerous occurrences. First, there is the very real danger that South 
African citizens and legal permanent and temporary residents alike will be subject 
to human rights violations under the broad categories of the Act. If any police officer 
is able to detain a suspected “illegal foreigner” without a warrant and hold him or 
her in an undisclosed location, there can be little oversight to ensure that human 
rights abrogations do not occur. The only substantial safeguard against civil and 
human rights violations takes the form of Department of Home Affairs supervision, 
and even this is limited in many cases to the jurisdiction of the Director-General. 
Second, the Act leaves the door wide open for hold-ups in government or civil 
service delivery to non-citizens. For example, if public hospitals are required by the 
legislation to enquire about a patient’s status before providing care, many immi-
grants might be afraid to access services - whether they are legal residents with a 
right to public health facilities or not. The consequences of such a development are 
obviously serious, with the risk of denial of rights for non-citizens irrespective of 
legal status.
The Act also has the potential to critically damage the stability of South African 
society, which is still in a delicate state of transition in the wake of apartheid. In 
the context of the nation-building project which has been so important to building a 
new South Africa, immigrants and other non-citizens have emerged as scapegoats. 
Although the preamble to the Act commits government to fight xenophobia and 
intolerance in South African society, the Act negates this promise by reinforcing 
criminal stereotypes and encouraging vigilantism. When a piece of public legislation 
defines a group of people in direct opposition to the majority of society and then calls 
for individuals, businesses and institutions to act as watchdogs for the state, the 
results can only be disastrous. By placing the means for enforcement of immigration 
law into the hands of the people, the state goes a long way towards advancing the 
intolerance and discrimination it is supposedly committed to fighting.
Perhaps the most important consequence of the Immigration Amendment Act 
is that it may very well fail in one of its primary purposes: to efficiently facilitate 
the movement of people, goods and services across South African borders. The Act 
introduces a cumbersome and disorganised mechanism for the enforcement and 
regulation of immigration law. It places the control over immigration matters in the 
hands of the Department of Home Affairs, but the 
responsibility for their implementation in the 
hands of an unspecified number of secondary 
parties. In both cases, there is little oversight 
to ensure the smooth operation of processes 
and protect against administrative corrup-
tion and misappropriation. This unwieldy 
structure for implementation does not easily 
allow for the rapid, orderly and safe move-
ment of non-citizens to and from the country.
We see, then, that the Immigration 
Amendment Act of 2004 does not signify a 
major departure from the Immigration Act 
of 2002. Although certain sections have been 
altered for the better, the underpinnings of 
the Act are the same. The historical preoc-
cupation with enforcement continues in the 
language of the Act and its provisions for 
Department of Home Affairs authority; this 
time it has been disguised by the delegation 
of responsibility to non-governmental par-
ties. 
Given that this enforcement-heavy Act is 
the only immigration legislation the country 
has for the time being, it is important to ask 
how stakeholders might cope until another 
piece of legislation arises. Of course, there have been calls for the revision and clari-
fication of South Africa’s immigration policy and legislation, but until such time as 
it is accepted that, while important, enforcement must not be the primary considera-
tion in immigration policy, no real change will be effected. 
To this end, it is key that a two-fold programme of action be embarked upon. 
First, stakeholders, including government, must intensify public anti-xenophobia 
campaigns to counter the possibility that the Act will encourage vigilantism and 
discrimination among individuals and institutions. 
Second, policy-makers must be educated about the value of facilitating movement 
between countries; they need to understand that this issue is fundamental to South 
Africa’s new role as a continental leader in politics and economics. 
Only when the human rights of migrants are fully protected and the flow of goods, 
people and services is productive and efficient can South Africa claim to have truly 
amended its immigration legislation. Enforcement is only part of the answer, but 
must not be emphasised to the exclusion of other equally important considerations. 
At the time of writing, emily Brice was an intern from 
the Human Rights Program at the University of Chicago.
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The Department of Home Affairs is suffering from what is probably its worst crisis in service delivery in recent history. Delays of up to three months or more for processing a work permit for skilled foreigners are not uncommon, which is a crisis in a global village situation where speedy responses for very mobile skilled people are critical. Other rapidly developing economies are competing with South Africa for skilled foreigners and undue delays in processing 
applicants will undoubtedly lead to losses of these potential skilled foreigners or 
investors. 
This breakdown in service delivery within the Department can be attributed to 
the following factors:
• Lack of human resource capacity - this is partially a numbers problem as there 
are approximately 1 000 vacant posts in the Department of Home Affairs, despite 
extensive advertisement campaigns. Yet no effective plan has been tabled to deal 
with this;
• Lack of training and experience of Home Affairs officials;
• Inconsistency in the application of the Immigration Act and its Regulations at 
various consular missions and regional offices has led to confusion and further 
inhibition on the movement of people. The much awaited Standard Operating 
Procedure Manual has unfortunately not yet seen the light of day, which is regret-
table as it would probably result in more consistency in the application of the 
law;
• Corruption at various levels of the bureaucratic chain and the inability or appar-
ent unwillingness/intransigence of the Department of Home Affairs to deal with 
this worsens the situation.
A further complication relates to the failure by the Department of Home Affairs 
to effectively regulate immigration practitioners and, possibly more seriously, peo-
ple who are not registered as immigration practitioners and are therefore operating 
outside of the law.
Section 46 of the Act provides that only an attorney, an advocate or a duly reg-
istered practitioner under the Act may conduct any work flowing from the Act. 
Attorneys are bound by the ethics and codes of conduct of the Attorneys Act as are 
trust monies paid to them which are also guaranteed by the Attorneys, Notaries and 
Conveyances Fidelity Guarantee Fund. Professional Indemnity Insurance is a statu-
torily required insurance that every attorney must have to practise law.
Surprisingly the Professional Indemnity Insurance for immigration practitioners 
registered under the Act was removed in the July 2005 Amendment Act. In addition, 
all authority, disciplinary and otherwise, which had been vested in the Association of 
Immigration Practitioners was also removed with this amendment.
Immigration “agents” are present in huge numbers at any Home Affairs office and 
operate with impunity. The public has no recourse against them, other than civil 
law. The Department has failed in enforcing the requirement that only an applicant 
in person, or his attorney/advocate or an immigration practitioner registered under 
the Act may lodge an application for temporary or permanent residence, and this 
is compounding the situation. It must be said that there are some very good, even 
excellent, immigration practitioners registered but most are either unregistered or 
unqualified to give advice which is essentially of a legal nature. Immigration law 
remains a minefield which should perhaps be reserved for attorneys and advocates 
only.
A further inhibiting factor regarding skilled foreigner applicants, specifically 
those falling within the quota categories, is that the Act brought about a require-
ment in July 2005 in terms of which the South African Qualifications Authority 
(SAQA) evaluation of qualifications became a statutory requirement which cannot 
be waived without an amendment to the Act. Because of the suddenness in which 
the Act was implemented, SAQA did not have time to build up its human resource 
capacity to deal with the deluge of applications that suddenly started streaming its 
way. This has resulted in delays of anywhere between one and five months for a so-
called “priority” application for evaluation. 
For example, a structural engineer may be required for an urgent project starting 
in a month or two, yet that person will not be able to lodge a properly completed 
application until the SAQA evaluation has been received. The result is that such an 
application will be delayed, and the applicant may move on to “greener” pastures 
where his work permit is processed speedily. At the same time it is recognised that 
verification of qualifications is, and must remain, an important element.
The first contact a potential immigrant has with the Department, whether she or 
he plans a temporary or permanent visit, will largely determine their future views 
of the Department. It is therefore essential, in an economy that needs skilled for-
eigners and investors, that this first interface be pleasant and amiable, whether the 
contact is made with a consular official at an embassy or high commission or at a 
regional office of the Department. Whether or not this is happening, the fact remains 
that impressions can often be a deciding factor in choosing whether to migrate to 
South Africa or not.
Even after an applicant has decided to migrate, either as a skilled worker, an 
investor or even a retiree, they require some degree of certainty so that they can 
begin planning their move to South Africa. If there is uncertainty at an embassy, 
high commission or regional office on the interpretation of qualifying requirements 
potential immigrants might change their minds. This must be urgently dealt with 
by the Department and the release of the Standard Operating Procedures Manual is 
urgent as it could help bring about uniformity in setting the criteria.
Our country is in a regional developmental phase and massive skills shortages 
in certain sectors means we have to employ skilled foreigners until the country is 
producing enough skilled people locally. To achieve this there are a number of fac-
tors which have to be considered very seriously and urgently by the Department of 
Home Affairs:
• A recruitment drive is needed to capacitate the Department of Home Affairs. The 
many law graduates currently passing through the tertiary educational system 
who are not finding articles or employment would be a good recruiting ground 
as they are already equipped with legal knowledge and would have completed 
courses in Constitutional Law and Administrative and Immigration Law;
• An effective training programme for Department of Home Affairs officials must be 
implemented, regionally and worldwide, to ensure that officials interfacing with 
the public are familiar with the complexities of the Act and can advise potential 
migrants of the requirements;
• The anti-corruption campaign promised at various levels of government must be 
taken seriously by the Minister and the Department;
• Effective control over who is lodging applications is needed so that only the appli-
cants in person, attorneys, advocates and immigration practitioners registered 
under the Act are allowed to represent potential migrants seeking work, investor 
and other permits.
Failure to deal with the above will undermine the implementation of the Act and 
all of the principles enshrined in its preamble.
Julian Pokroy is a specialist immigration and nationality law attorney who currently 
heads the Law Society of South Africa Immigration and Refugee Law Committee, the 
South African Chamber of Business Migration Policy Working Group and is a member 
of the Immigration Advisory Board to the Minister of Home Affairs. 
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As one of the most senior women in South African government, the Minister of Home Affairs has paid particular attention to the experi-ences of women migrants, recognis-ing the “emotional trauma” suffered by female refugees and their vulner-
ability on the journey to South Africa.  
To this end, some hurdles to gender equality have 
been overcome in the Immigration Amendment Act, 
with changes including revised definitions of “mar-
riage” and “customary marriage” to be consistent with 
existing legislation. 
As in the previous Immigration Act (13 of 2002), both 
heterosexual and same-sex partners are included in the 
definition of a “spouse” and the new Act removes the 
requirement of qualifying “cohabitation and mutual 
financial and emotional support” with a “prescribed 
affidavit substantiated by a notarial contract”. 
Showing particular foresight, the Immigration 
Regulations also anticipate application procedures for 
people who have undergone a sex change.
Somewhat worrisome, however, is the Department’s 
retaining of the “good faith spousal relationship” clause 
relating to permanent residence in particular, which 
aims to clamp down on “marriages of convenience”. 
In the previous Immigration Act, permanent resi-
dence was available to spouses of citizens and perma-
nent residents provided that the Department was “sat-
isfied that a good faith spousal relationship exists” and 
on condition that residence would lapse if the spousal 
relationship ended within a period of three years. 
This requirement had the negative impact of treat-
ing all spousal relationships as marriages of conven-
ience in effect until the three-year mark was passed, 
irrespective of the initial spirit of these relationships. 
It may also have provided a legislated impetus for 
migrant women, as well as men, to stay in abusive rela-
tionships to keep their status in South Africa. 
With the new Immigration Amendment Act, the 
required period of a “good faith spousal relationship” 
is even more protracted, with five years of marriage 
required before foreign spouses are eligible to apply 
for permanent residence. Again, this may lapse if the 
relationship ends within two years of the granting of 
residence. 
Effectively the new Act therefore requires seven 
instead of three years of a spousal relationship before 
foreign spouses have secure status in South Africa. 
This will ultimately translate into far longer periods of 
insecurity for both South African and foreign spouses 
alike.
From a gender perspective, the changes brought 
about through the Amendment Act will have the great-
est impact on women migrants wishing to settle in 
South Africa in the long term and with a spouse. 
For women wishing to work or conduct business in 
South Africa, or even to settle independently, the skills- 
and wealth-based criteria for residence on the grounds 
of permanent employment, extraordinary skills, busi-
ness establishment or retirement remain obstacles. 
Many women in the region still face limited access to 
education, training and resources such as credit and 
productive assets. 
Cross-border traders in the region, for example, con-
stitute a major group of women conducting business in 
South Africa. Research from across the continent has 
shown that women traders have become major agents 
of economic development on both sides of the border 
and that small-scale trade makes a sizable and rising 
contribution to national Gross Domestic Product. 
A USAID estimate in 1998 valued cross-border trade 
between Malawi and neighbouring countries at US$44 
million. Addressing the 50th UN Commission on the 
Status of Women, Minister Mapisa-Nqakula stated 
that the “contribution of cross-border traders to the 
South African economy was recognised last year when 
we implemented our amended Immigration Act by pro-
viding special permits to cross-border traders”. 
In a subsequent Budget Speech, the Minister also 
referred to women cross-border traders as beneficiar-
ies of policy changes aimed at making travel to South 
Africa easier.
However, while the Amendment Act does carry over 
the cross-border permits featured in previous legisla-
tion, applicants who are citizens of neighbouring coun-
tries are now also required to hold passports to qualify 
for the permit. Given that the 2002 Immigration Act 
only required a national identity document for appli-
cants from neighbouring countries, it would appear 
that the Amendment Act in fact makes it more difficult 
for women to obtain a cross-border permit. Further, 
neither the Amendment Act nor the Immigration 
Regulations explicitly legalise trade for migrants once 
they have arrived in South Africa.
Women cross-border traders and shoppers in the 
region are therefore likely to continue to face many of 
the practical obstacles to entering, conducting busi-
ness in and leaving South Africa than they have in the 
past. 
In a heavily gendered sector of the informal econ-
omy, these obstacles include difficulties in obtaining 
travel documents, the prohibitive cost of visas and vul-
nerability to crime, often at the hands of opportunistic 
immigration, customs and police officers. Ultimately, 
these obstacles prevent women in the region from ben-
efiting from cross-border trade at a level on a par with 
male migrants.
In 2005, SAMP conducted a qualitative study on 
women’s experiences in migrating to and from South 
Africa which revealed a number of gender-specific 
motives for migration, obstacles encountered and rec-
ommendations for policy at regional level.  
Interviews showed that women in Southern Africa 
feel that migration, and their freedom to migrate, 
is extremely important. In many cases, small-scale 
cross-border trade was a critical household survival 
strategy and an economic activity that supported entire 
extended families. 
However, outside of economic incentives, women 
also felt migration offered them an important opportu-
nity for new experiences and encounters with different 
cultures. One cross-border trader from Zimbabwe told 
SAMP, “I know so many things and the good thing is 
that I now know different cultures. I’m very free. I’ve 
learnt so many languages, so it’s very interesting. If I 
can skip a month without coming here, I feel like there 
is something incomplete in me.”
Visa cost a major hurdle for  
cross-border traders 
Nation	and	region
During her presentation of the immigration amenDment bill to the national assembly in 
august 00, the minister of home affairs, nosiviwe mapisa-nqaKula, maDe a “commitment 
not to Discriminate on the basis of genDer” in the Drafting anD application of migration 
policy. kATE LEFkO-EVERETT finDs out what the women most affecteD by the law have to 
say.
minister of home affairs, nosiviwe mapisa-nqakula, has 
recognised the vulnerability of female refugees on the 
journey to south africa. PictureNet Africa
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Nation	and	region
November 1996: Minister of Home Affairs, M.G. Buthelezi, appoints Task Team to 
draft Green Paper on International Migration.
May 1997: Publication of Draft Green Paper on International Migration for public 
comment. Green Paper recommends separation of immigration and refugee policy 
and legislation, and that immigration be a tool for development.
August 1997: Closing date for submissions and comment on Draft Green Paper. 
Department of Home Affairs receives 52 submissions from organisations and 
individuals.
March 1998: Minister appoints Task Team of Department of Home Affairs officials 
and non-governmental organisation representatives to prepare White Paper on 
Refugee Policy.
July 1998: Publication of Draft White Paper on Refugee Legislation. Public submis-
sions received until 20 July 1998. 
August 1998: Revised White Paper on Refugees submitted to Cabinet for approval.
August 1998: Minister appoints Task Team to prepare White Paper on Immigration 
Policy.
November 1998: Refugee Act published in Government Gazette and becomes law.
March 1999: Publication of Draft White Paper on International Migration, “modified 
and approved for public comment by Cabinet”. Closing date for public comment 
set for November 1999.
November 1999: Draft White Paper on International Migration tabled in Home 
Affairs Parliamentary Portfolio Committee. Committee resolves to conduct public 
hearings.
February 2000: Minister of Home Affairs announces and publishes Draft Immigration 
Bill and invites public comment. Deadline for public comment set for May 2000.
May 2000: Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs conducts public 
hearings on Draft White Paper on International Migration.
July 2000: Ministry of Home Affairs conference on Regulating Migration in the 21st 
Century held in Parliament to discuss Immigration Bill.
August 2000: Draft Immigration Bill submitted to Cabinet.
August 2000: Parliamentary Portfolio Committee conducts regional public hearings 
on Draft White Paper.
September 2000: Parliamentary Portfolio Committee releases Draft Interim Report 
on White Paper, criticising the process.
November 2000: Parliamentary Committee releases Penultimate Report on the 
International Migration White Paper, concluding that the process of policymaking 
was flawed and expressing the need to “go back to the drawing board”.
March 2001: Cabinet rejects Draft Immigration Bill and asks Ministry of Home 
Affairs to redraft. Cabinet prepares confidential “framework document” to provide 
guidelines for redrafting.
April 2001: Revised draft of Immigration Bill submitted to Cabinet.
June 2001: Draft Immigration Bill tabled in Parliament. 
September 2001: Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs refers draft 
bill to State Law Advisers to test constitutionality.
March 2002: Portfolio Committee develops extensive programme of public hearings 
to consult on Draft Immigration Bill. Minister warns of impending Constitutional 
Court deadline requiring changes to existing immigration law. Hearings are con-
ducted during April 2002.
May 2002: Immigration Act No 13 of 2002 adopted by Parliament and published in 
Government Gazette.
December 2002: Publication of Immigration Regulations to provide for implementa-
tion of immigration law.
February 2003: Immigration Regulations challenged in court. Court finds in favour 
of Department of Home Affairs, but matter referred to Constitutional Court.
May 2003: Immigration Advisory Board established.
June 2003: Constitutional Court approves immigration regulations. New immigra-
tion law comes into effect.
April 2004: New Minister of Home Affairs, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, appointed. 
Process of revising immigration law initiated shortly after appointment.
October 2004: Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004 published in Government 
Gazette. 
July 2005: New Immigration Regulations published. Immigration Amendment Act 
19 of 2004 comes into effect.
Immigration	Policy	Reform	in	South	Africa
Because of the high value women place on migra-
tion, participants in the SAMP study felt that migra-
tion policy should, in its essence, facilitate easy, safe 
and legal travel across borders. Entering South Africa 
was relatively easy for women nationals of countries no 
longer requiring a visa, and one Mozambican migrant 
felt South African policy had improved substantially 
when visas for visits under 30 days were waived 
between the two countries through a bilateral agree-
ment in 2005. 
However, for migrants from other countries in 
the region, obtaining a visa was difficult and costly. 
Most women interviewed by SAMP had passports, 
but some said that because of difficulties in getting 
visas, “you can have a passport and then never use it”. 
Zimbabwean women in particular felt the cost of visas 
were prohibitive and time periods allotted insufficient, 
even for cross-border traders and shoppers only looking 
to enter South Africa temporarily to buy goods to take 
back home to sell. 
According to one, this “leaves you with nothing to 
feed the children at home, just trying to get a visa so 
you can buy them something in South Africa”. 
While most women interviewed wanted to travel to 
South Africa through legal and regular means, some 
chose to “jump the fence” when they felt a visa was an 
unattainable prospect, while others overstayed rather 
than returning home, feeling they would not be able to 
afford a visa again. 
As described by one migrant who had entered South 
Africa illegally, “to have a visa you need money. So 
I couldn’t because I didn’t have money. It is difficult 
because women can’t follow it. So you find that they 
risk their lives because they want to cross and come 
this side”.
In spite of the value of trade, and the inroads it has 
made in combating poverty, creating jobs and promot-
ing women’s empowerment in the region, small-scale 
cross-border businesses are also constrained by cus-
toms costs. 
Women interviewed by SAMP were shopping and 
trading in goods ranging from clothing, to broomsticks, 
baskets, vegetables, cosmetics, garlic crushers, doilies 
and curios. Problems arising for migrants included 
inconsistency in the valuation of goods by customs 
officials at the border, solicitation of bribes, difficul-
ties in providing receipts and proof of value added tax, 
and the high duties charged, which threatened already 
slim profit margins. As one trader commented, “we are 
not refusing to pay duties, but they should charge us 
reasonably”.
Women suggested to SAMP that regional policy 
should aim to remove some of the barriers to cross- 
border movement and trade currently posed by existing 
migration legislation, but this has not happened in the 
new Amendment Act. 
Many women entrepreneurs will therefore continue 
to face constraints on the expansion of small cross- 
border businesses. Others may ultimately choose not to 
use legal or regular means of travel. One cross-border 
trader made a pertinent suggestion: perhaps it is time 
for governments in the region “to sit down as Southern 
Africans and talk about ladies”.
Kate Lefko-everett is a SAMP Researcher.
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Immigration	Advisory	Board	
The first Immigration Advisory Board (IAB) was established in May 2003 in terms of the Immigration Act of 2002, which was South Africa’s first effort at completely rewriting our immigration legisla-tion. In adapting to a newly democratic environment, characterised by rapidly increasing movement of people, the Department of Home Affairs realised that the old Aliens Control Act was patently inad-equate to meet immediate needs and imminent challenges. 
It also recognised that the complexities of migration engage departments across 
the spectrum of government. To properly manage migration, coordination across 
departments was essential. 
By establishing the Board, the Immigration Act created a forum in which a vari-
ety of department representatives could deliberate on specific matters and seek 
consensus, to give the Minister of Home Affairs advice that was properly canvassed, 
agreeable to all and workable. 
In addition to the government component, the Board included representatives 
from civil society, organised business and organised labour, as well as individuals 
who were appointed on the grounds of their expertise in administration, regulatory 
matters or immigration law, control, adjudication or enforcement. The two compo-
nents of the Board, civil society and government, were perfectly balanced to create 
a membership of 20.
Between May 2003 and July 2005, the Board advised on the formulation of the 
2003 Regulations and the 2004 Amendment Bill and draft Regulations. It held four 
public consultations, visited the Lindela Repatriation Centre, engaged three key 
research projects, advised the Minister on various policy matters, considered the 
Department’s Turnaround Strategy and overall progress, and deliberated on exemp-
tion applications for permanent residence as required by section 31 of the Act.
In addition to the Board’s functions detailed under section 5 of the Act, sev-
eral other sections required consultation with the Board prior to action. Section 4 
required consultation before approving the delegation of powers and functions by 
the Department. Section 30 required consultation before identifying a foreigner as 
an undesirable person. Section 31 required that the Board deliberate on exemption 
applications for permanent residence and advise the Minister on whether or not to 
grant an exemption. All of these consultation requirements have been removed in 
the Immigration Amendment Act.
In a sense, the original Act gave the Board oversight powers of the Department 
of Home Affairs. Section 47 required that the Director-General inform the Board on 
measures and proposals to increase the efficacy, efficiency and cost-effectiveness of 
the Department. The section 5 functions required the Board to advise the Minister 
on the implementation of immigration policy by the Department, and to review 
the Departments decisions on adjudication, when requested by the Minister. The 
Amendment Act removes the Board’s oversight of policy implementation, limiting its 
advisory scope to policy formulation. It also removes the Board’s mandate to review 
the Department’s decisions. 
In removing the Board’s oversight role, the Department gave consideration to 
the sufficient number of existing oversight measures. The reporting responsibili-
ties of the Minister and Director-General within the Government Clusters and to 
Parliament, coupled with the role of the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs, sug-
gest that further oversight would be a duplication of functions, effectively diluting 
what could otherwise be a dynamic advisory body.
In terms of the Amendment Act, the functions of the Board are now two-fold; to 
advise the Minister and to offer a forum for interdepartmental cooperation. Advice to 
the Minister is limited to the contents of Regulations, the formulation of policy per-
taining to immigration matters and any other matters relating to the Act on which 
the Minister may request advice. Section 7 reiterates the need for the Minister to 
consult the Board before making Regulations. 
The narrowing of the Board’s functions is accompanied by a change in the 
Board’s composition. The balance among the 20 members has shifted through the 
inclusion of the Head of the National Immigration Branch, and representatives 
from the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and the National 
Intelligence Coordinating Committee. The rank of all government representatives 
has now been set at Deputy Director-General. Having included three more govern-
ment members, the five civil society members were reduced to two; one each from 
organised business and organised labour. Public nominations are no longer explicitly 
required to appoint these members. In addition, the Minister may appoint up to five 
experts. From among this new Board, the Minister will choose a Chairperson and 
Deputy Chairperson, neither of whom will be fulltime appointments. 
These changes to the Board’s composition reflect its new role as an interdepart-
mental cooperation forum. The five experts will assist in developing sound advice, 
without representing a specific interest group or the public at large. The presence 
of business and labour will ensure that policies recommended by the Board are 
realistic on a practical level. No additional input is considered necessary, which also 
accounts for the deletion of subsection 4(3)(c), which allowed the Board to invite 
immigration officers and other employees of the Department to attend or participate 
in its meetings. 
Migration is a complex and often controversial field. In dealing with it, an advi-
sory board must have a clearly defined identity. Either it is a widely consultative 
forum, incorporating the broad and manifold interests of civil society and offer-
ing advice that is effectively a compromise of all interests, or it is a forum to seek 
consensus across departments to develop advice that is uniform, sound and able to 
complement government’s foreign, social and economic policies. The 2002 Board was 
the former. The new Board seeks to become the latter. 
Accordingly, the need for consensus and voting has been removed. The aims of 
government as a whole should ensure that policies of individual departments do not 
clash irretrievably. In theory, an unsolvable objection from any department would 
flag a fundamental policy problem that the Minister may see fit to take to Cabinet. 
As a further assurance of comprehensive interdepartmental canvassing of issues, 
the Board may no longer establish and operate through Standing Committees. Ad 
hoc task teams may perform specific tasks for the Board, but cannot substitute the 
Board or usurp any decision-making power. 
The full Board shall meet at least quarterly, without being specifically asked to 
do so by the Minister or Director-General, although additional meetings may be 
convened at their request. In terms of the Regulations, a meeting will now be validly 
constituted when at least 10 members are present, whether the Board is operating 
with 20 members or only 16. The Minister may appoint up to five individual experts, 
but need not appoint all five. 
In effect, the Amendment Act has streamlined the Board, removing its capacity 
to conduct research, a function that is vested in the National Immigration Branch. 
It has taken away the oversight role, which is carried out through internal account-
ability structures as well as through the Department’s reporting responsibilities. It 
has taken away a considerable amount of public representation, creating an inter-
departmental cooperation forum in which all matters of migration – including those 
highly sensitive to the national interest – may be coordinated. 
Indeed, the Board has been narrowed to its essential core. What remains is the 
potential for well-considered, workable, effective policy advice that enhances govern-
ment’s vision and meets South Africa’s migration needs. 
Nevertheless, this potential 
benefit is yet to be realised. While 
it has been a year since the com-
ing into force of the Immigration 
Amendment Act, the new IAB is 
yet to be appointed. It would be 
a pity to see an undue delay in 
this Board’s contribution to the 
migration debate. 
At the time of writing, Lyndith 
Waller was the Secretary of 
the South African Immigration 
Advisory Board.
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with the coming into force of the immigration amenDment act in July 005, the composition anD functions of the 
immigration aDvisory boarD were changeD. LYNDITH WALLER writes that the changes reflecteD a somewhat  
Different intention for the boarD, removing executive functions anD effectively creating an inter- 
Departmental cooperation forum on all matters of migration.
